INTRODUCTION
No free man shall be taken, or imprisoned, or dispossessed, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any way destroyed nor will we go upon him, nor will we send against him except by the lawful judgement of his peers or by the law of the land. 1 The real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may achieve. 2 The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States 3 and the bombings of 7 July 2005 in London 4 led to the enactment of anti-terrorism legislation in the United Kingdom (UK) and many other states as a direct consequence. The threat of terrorism is not new to the UK: last century's Irish Republican Army's resort to terrorism serves as an early example of the use of asymmetric warfare 5 as a means of achieving political goals. However, the present international terrorism threat to the UK (and its strategic allies) has changed in its scope, nature and modus operandi: 6 today's new challenge is the appearance of European 'home-grown' terrorism. Three of the bombers were born in the United Kingdom, but all four were inspired by AlQaeda. 5 10 the debate focusing on an apparent conflict arising from the need to protect human rights while fighting terrorism at the same time, 11 For the British public the legislation also puts to the test an 800 year old core principle of the common law on personal liberty, as established under the Magna Carta of 1215. One of the more controversial aspects of ATL was the introduction of control orders as highlighted by Lord Hoffmann in his above cited pronouncement.
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005
(PTA). Control orders are designed to restrict or prevent an individual's suspicious activities with a view to countering the threat of terrorism in general. 13 The rationale and the very nature of such orders -which are mostly intended to be pre-emptive or preventative of terrorist crime -often raise the question of their overall compatibility with human rights and civil liberties in general http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/5133535/Al-Qaeda-terror-plot-tobomb-Easter-shoppers.html>: 'An al-Qaeda cell was days away from carrying out an "Easter spectacular" of co-ordinated suicide bomb attacks on shopping centres in Manchester, police believe'. 9 The term ATL refers to all types of legislation passed with the aim of fighting terrorism, and reflects the historically changing nature and 'landscape' of terrorism. 10 14 Debate has also centred on? the compatibility of control orders with art 6 of the ECHR, the judicial process under which a control order is confirmed and also the right to disclosure of evidence. Rights (ECHR) in particular. 15 The new Tory-Liberal government criticised former Prime Minister Gordon Brown's anti-terrorism legislation on many occasions before coming to power. 16 In the light of such a prospect, it is time to take stock of the present (2010) ATL. This article will provide a reflective analysis of judicial challenges to the control order regime in the UK by assessing their compatibility with article 5 of the ECHR. It will compare the UK position with the situation in Australia and Canada. Finally, other possible and workable alternatives (including reforms) to the system of control orders will be examined. This article is aimed at the interested Australian reader who might have taken an interest in the Australian debate about the establishment of an independent reviewer of terrorism laws in Australia and who would like to learn more about the UK situation as a comparison.
It remains to be seen whether some of the stricter ATL measures will now be abolished or at least amended.
II CONTROL ORDERS UNDER UK ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION

A UK Anti-Terrorism Legislation post 2000
The first comprehensive piece of anti-terrorism legislation passed in the UK was the Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000) . The TA 2000 consolidated and reformed previous ATL 17 by formulating a comprehensive set of codes to replace the hastily drafted and fragmented laws that were seen in the UK prior to the TA 2000's implementation. , the UK government passed the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA). A major difference between it and the TA 2000 was the inclusion of a derogation clause which covered cases of non-compliance with article 5 of the ECHR. 20 The derogation was made under article 15 of the ECHR (section 14 of the UK Human Rights Act, which implements the ECHR) which allows all Member States to derogate from their obligations under the Convention in times of public emergency threatening the life of the nation. The ATCSA was a legislative reflection of the findings of the European Court of Justice in Chahal v United Kingdom (1996) . 21 Part 4 of the ATCSA allows for the detention of terrorist suspects as well as for the deportation of foreign nationals, its powers thus falling within the wider ambit of immigration asylum police powers.
There the UK was informed of the possible implications of the deportation of a terrorist suspect to a state where torture was a possibility, namely that the deportation might constitute a contravention of the strict torture prohibition of article 3 of the ECHR. 22 These powers have hardly been used, with only a total of sixteen detention orders having been issued. 23 and consequently led to no executive repeal. 28 forced the government to withdraw an earlier derogation clause in order to avoid a possible violation of articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR. 29 The House of Lords held (Lord Hoffmann dissenting) that, in the circumstances of that case, an 'emergency threatening the life of the nation' 30 existed sufficiently to warrant a derogation notice under article 15. It consequently dismissed the appellants' first grounds of appeal. 31 However, the Lords concluded that the measures implemented under Part 4 of the ATCSA (essentially detention without trial) were not proportionate, and therefore not 'strictly required by the exigencies of the situation'.
32 Their Lordships also upheld the appellant's argument that the section 23 provisions were discriminatory and therefore incompatible with article 14 of the ECHR, which provides that Convention rights should be enjoyed without discrimination. 33 The Lords stated that the statutory provisions allowed for foreign nationalsunlike UK nationals -to be deprived of their liberty, Under the PTA a control order is 'an order against an individual that imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism',
The PTA was passed primarily to replace Part 4 of the ATCSA with the aim of allowing the executive to maintain further 'control' of individuals suspected of terrorism. 38 protection that is deemed 'necessary for purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity'. 39 The scope of these restrictions for the controlee is quite wide 40 and the restrictions can be used in combination with each other, with many controlees having multiple restrictions placed upon them.
41
The PTA allows essentially for two types of control order, namely derogating and non-derogating orders. A derogating control order is one that imposes obligations on the controlee which are 'so draconian in their intrusion into liberty' 42 that they can be justified only by means of explicit reference to a derogation notice 43 36 Walker, above n 18, 214. under article 15 of the ECHR. Derogating control orders 37 Ibid. It did not help the discussion that the PTA became law just seventeen days after it had been brought before Parliament as a bill. 38 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) c 2, s 1(1). 39 Ibid 1(3). 40 These include the following restrictions: s 1(4)(d) -a restriction on association and communication with specified persons or with other persons generally; s 1(4)(f) -a prohibition on the controlee being at specified places or within a specified area at specific times or specific days; s 1(4)(j) -a requirement that the controlee give access to specific persons to their place of residence, and; s 1(4)(k) -a requirement that the persons be allowed to search the premises in order to ascertain whether obligations under the order are about to be contravened. 41 45 and are renewable if the derogation notice remains in force. 46 Considering these legal implications, it does not surprise that the government to date has not applied for derogating control orders.
47
The alternative is the issuance of a so called 'non-derogating' control order, which is issued by the Home Secretary with the confirmation of a court under sections 2 and 3 of the PTA. A non-derogating order must not, however, deprive a controlee of liberty pursuant to the terms of article 5 of the ECHR, 48 Under section 2(1) of the PTA, the Home Secretary can make a nonderogating control order if he or she has 'reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity'; thus excluding any such measures as permanent detention at a single address. 49 or he or she 'considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of terrorism, to make a control order imposing obligations on that individual'. 50 Non-derogating control orders expire after twelve months, with the option of renewal by the Home Secretary under section 2(4) of the PTA. In case of a renewal of the order, there is no automatic referral to a full judicial review, but the individual concerned can apply to the court for a further judicial review.
51
44 Under s 4(1)(a) of the PTA the court must hold an immediate preliminary hearing on an application from the Secretary of State to decide whether to make a derogating control order against an individual. No time limit is, however, mentioned in the Act and the word 'immediate' is not defined within it.
On renewal of the order under section 2(6), the Home Secretary has to state that the order would protect the public from the risk of terrorism, and must justify the obligations imposed by the renewed order. However, there is no mandatory review requirement that evidence be adduced that the individual has actually been involved in any terrorism-related activity. 45 Ibid 4(8). 46 Under s 6 of the PTA the Home Secretary has the power, if necessary, to impose derogating obligations under the original derogation. 47 Carlile, above n 41, 15. 48 Ibid s 1(2)(a). 49 In JJ the six respondents were subject to an 18 hour curfew in designated one bedroom flats which were located in an area deliberately unfamiliar to them.
58
The appellants were ordered to wear electronic tags and were confined to movements within 72 square kilometres beyond their residence, not including any area which they had previously lived. Ibid. time. 60 The House of Lords held, by a three to two majority (Lord Hoffmann and Lord Caswell dissenting), that the obligations imposed by the control orders deprived the respondents of their liberty and therefore breached article 5. Lord Bingham concluded that the controlees lives 'were wholly regulated by the Home Office, as a prisoner's would be', 61 consequently concurring with the prior judgement of Sullivan J that the restrictions were 'the antithesis of liberty and equivalent to imprisonment'.
62
The scope of the right to liberty under article 5 of the ECHR 63 was outlined by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Guzzardi v Italy.
64
is not concerned with mere restrictions on liberty of movement... In order to determine whether someone has been 'deprived of his liberty' within the meaning of Article 5 (art. 5), the starting point must be his concrete situation and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question.
The right 65 In the earlier High Court hearing of JJ, Sullivan J relied on Guzzardi when stating that the obligations imposed by the orders were so severe that they amounted to a deprivation of liberty, contrary to article 5 of the ECHR. They amounted to more than a mere restriction of the right to freedom of movement, 66 a right protected under article 2 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR, which the UK has not ratified yet. 69 Lord Hoffmann took the view that a controlee had to be actually imprisoned, or in circumstances which came very close to an actual imprisonment, for there to be a deprivation of liberty. 70 Nevertheless, the majority of the Lords (with Lord Hoffmann and Lord Carswell dissenting) held that the general social isolation imposed on the controlees was, in effect, 'solitary confinement', due to the length of the curfew (18 hours) and the lack of opportunity to interact with the outside world. 71 Lord Bingham stated that an analogy with detention in an open prison was apt, though the actual fate of the controlees was bleaker, since they could 'not enjoy the association with others and the access to entertainment facilities which a prisoner in an open prison would expect to enjoy'. 72 The control orders were therefore quashed by the Lords, as the Secretary of State had no power to make the orders as they were clearly incompatible with article 5 of the ECHR, and the defects of the orders could not be cured by amending specific obligations. 73 The case of JJ demonstrates how the Law Lords have seemingly taken a narrow approach to article 5. This was aptly shown in Lord Hoffmann's summation of the case when he stated that the right of liberty could be breached only by 'literal physical restraint'; 74 otherwise there would be a danger that 'the law would place too great a restriction on the powers of the state to deal with serious terrorist threats to the lives of its citizens'. 75 Lord Hoffmann further observed that the liberty of an individual is 'too precious to be sacrificed for any other reason than to safeguard the survival of the state', which he felt was under threat from terrorism. Ibid [44] . 76 Ibid. emergency and that the right to liberty should be 'absolute in its terms'.
77
Whether the country is in a general national emergency is certainly a moot point, as highlighted in the above case of A.
78
B Response to JJ by the Government in Relation to Curfew Periods
The then Home Secretary sought to rectify the situation in which JJ had left the government by arguing that if control orders breached article 5, then the courts should not quash the orders, but only the offending obligations, or should direct modifications to them. 79 However, as stated above, the Lords in JJ had taken the line that the derogation orders were effectively a nullity, and could not be cured, and new orders were required.
80 JJ was subsequently taken by the government effectively to indicate that control orders with a 16 hour curfew, together with the restrictions applicable in JJ, would not breach article 5. 81 Consequently, the UK government rejected the recommendation made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights that the maximum length of a curfew should not exceed 12 hours. 82 The Home Office clearly does not view JJ as fundamentally undermining the viability of control orders, even though modified arrangements on restrictions entail greater expenditure on surveillance.
83
The notion that the maximum curfew length for control orders is 16 hours is derived from Lord Brown's judgment in JJ. that 16 hour curfew periods would not amount to deprivation of liberty, as such a regime 'restricts the suspect's liberty of movement rather than actually deprives him of his liberty'. 85 His Lordship stated that this should nevertheless be the 'absolute limit'. Lord Brown expanded on his reasoning by stating that the European (Strasbourg) Court of Human Rights would surely conclude that a longer curfew regime than 16 hours a day would be a deprivation of liberty, 86 and that it might conclude 16 hours to be too long. But this was for the Strasbourg Court to decide.
87
The Joint Committee on Human Rights 88 asserted in general that the topic of curfew periods would find its way to the Strasbourg Court in due course. It stated also that, in the meantime, Parliament should reach its own view about what the right to liberty under article 5 requires in relation to curfew periods, and should then define it in the statutory framework governing control orders.
89
Legal opinion seems to be divided on whether to confirm the view that a 16 hour curfew does not constitute a de facto deprivation of liberty in terms of article 5 ECHR. See, for example, the case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v AE. 90 The
most recent case on this issue -Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP
91 -has given the Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords) a chance to establish whether a 16 hour curfew is contrary to article 5. At first instance the High Court had held that a 16 hour curfew can effect a deprivation of liberty when it is coupled with other restrictions, to the extent that it imposes a high degree of social isolation. 92 They held that it was 'inappropriate to draw a sharp distinction' as regard to curfew period lengths.
Keith J held that the restrictions were the 'equivalent of internal exile' which caused AP to be 'socially isolated during the relatively few hours in the day when he is not under house arrest [and unable]to make even social 85 arrangements because pre-arranged meetings ... are prohibited'. 93 This led to Keith J concluding that the restrictions placed on AP were a deprivation of liberty rather than a restriction of movement. 94 The Court of Appeal 95 reversed the decision of the High Court (Carnwath LJ dissenting) and held that Keith J was wrong in law to permit the issue of family visits to 'tip the balance' towards a breach of article 5 ECHR, 96 as it was not impossible for him to be visited by his family. 97 The Supreme Court has, however, subsequently reversed the decision of the Court of Appeal and held that the 16 hour curfew period along with the restrictions placed upon AP, did amount to a deprivation of liberty. 98 Lord Brown concluded that the practical difficulties faced by the family in visiting AP should not have been ignored by the Court of Appeal and restored Keith J's original judgment.
99
C The Case of E and the Possible Conflict with Article 5
Similarly to JJ, the case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department v E 100 focused on the question of whether control order curfew periods constitute a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of article 5. The suspect E was required to reside at a particular address and remain there for a 12 hour period between 7pm and 7am. E was prohibited from having unauthorised visitors to his apartment and any pre-arranged meetings elsewhere, and was prohibited from using a mobile phone or any equipment capable of connecting to the internet. Initially, the High Court as the court of first instance had found that the cumulative effect of the curfew period, and the other obligations imposed by the control order, deprived E of his liberty, therefore breaching article 5 of the ECHR. 102 The High Court followed the approach of the Court of Appeal decision in JJ, in looking at the cumulative effect of the restrictions set out in the control order. 103 The Court of Appeal, however, took a different view, 104 with Pill LJ stating that the starting point for a consideration on whether article 5(1) had been breached was to consider the actual physical liberty of the person 105 in terms of an individual liberty in the classic sense. 106 The Lord Justices found a clear distinction between the facts of E and those of JJ and declared the cases to be very different in their facts.
107 E was deprived only of the right to leave his home in the overnight hours (7pm to 7am) with no geographical restriction place upon him during the daytime. 108 This led the Court of Appeal to hold that the degree of physical restraint upon the liberty of E, bearing in mind the 'type, duration, effects and manner of implementation' of the order, 109 was far from constituting a deprivation of his liberty under article 5. In conclusion, the jurisprudence emanating from the courts shows that control order curfew periods and restrictions have to be assessed on a case by case basis to decide whether they contravene article 5. The cases of JJ and E clearly showed that previously courts considered curfew periods of 16 hours or less as a non deprivation of liberty within the meaning of article 5. However, with the recent Supreme Court ruling in AP, the courts have now seemingly taken the stance that a 16 hour curfew coupled with other restrictions does in fact amount to a deprivation of liberty. It has yet to be seen whether the government will now impose curfew periods of no more than 16 hours in order to comply with the decisions emanating from the Supreme Court. So far the government has resisted the continued pressure applied to it by the Joint Committee on Human Rights to have the maximum curfew length set at 12 hours, arguing that if it did this, it would significantly damage its ability to protect the public from the threat of terrorism. 112 Some academic commentators seem to affirm this view, considering that, for the purpose of combating terrorism, significant limitations to fundamental civil liberties may have to take place within the scope of the ECHR. 113 Others point out that case law implies the opposite: the case of E, considered in conjunction with JJ, indicates that the government's policy of employing non-derogating control orders is proving ineffective in security terms. 114 The courts' refusal to accept curfews which confine individuals to their homes for long periods of time, as seen in JJ and AP, as being compatible with article 5 of the ECHR, puts the government in a difficult situation. If the courts will allow only limited curfews, such as the one in E, there might be a possibility that controlees will abscond. Also, limited curfew periods will still allow determined suspects to proceed with possible terrorist-related activities, thus defeating the whole rationale behind the implementation of control orders. Doubtless, courts and government will continue to disagree 112 Joint Committee on Human Rights, above n 81. 113 Sandell, above n 11, 124. 114 Fenwick, above n 80, 267. 115 Carlile, above n 41, [17] . Lord Carlile lists a total of 7 control order abscondees.
over the difficult task of balancing the scope of protection granted by article 5 and the need to safeguard the security of the nation.
IV LOOKING ABROAD -CONTROL ORDERS IN AUSTRALIA AND CANADA
Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 other Commonwealth countries have followed the example of the UK and introduced their own form of 'control orders' to their legislative systems. Australia and Canada are the main Commonwealth jurisdictions which have implemented legislation, which is designed to restrict or prevent an individual's movements as a means of combating terrorism and which raises questions of human rights compatibility.
A The Australian Control Order Regime
Overview
Post 9/11Australia implemented a range of anti-terrorism measures following the September 11 attacks on the United States. 116 Although there has not been a terrorist attack on Australian soil itself, Australia nonetheless has been directly affected by terrorism.
117 Australian citizens died in the September 11 attacks and only a year later, on 12 October 2002, 88 Australian holiday makers were killed in the Bali bombings in Indonesia. 118 In the absence of any substantial experience, either of a terrorist threat or of designing a legal framework to counter it, the Commonwealth of Australia has relied heavily on the anti-terrorism laws of the UK when constructing its own national security framework. were all introduced into the Criminal Code Act through the ATA.
123 of the Criminal Code Act can last for periods of up to 12 months, similar to the UK control order system. The issuance of a control order involves a senior Australian Federal Police (AFP) member making a written request to the Attorney-General. 124 Once consent has been given, 125 the senior AFP member must then put a request before a court. 126 The court must then be satisfied that, on the balance of probabilities, the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act, or that the individual has provided training to, or received training from, a listed terrorist organisation.
127
The Australian control order system therefore follows the example of the UK Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), concerned with individuals who are involved in 'terrorism related activity' which is defined in section 1 (9) controlee can be placed.
129
One such exception is the fact that Australian control orders are issued by the federal courts rather than a member of the executive. In the UK the Secretary of State issues the control order, which is then confirmed by the court, and the judiciary has a role only in cases where control orders are challenged. It appears, therefore, that the Australian judiciary, in its active role in issuing control orders, is likely to ensure stronger protection of an individual controlee's rights than would be the case in the UK. Some commentators see this strong role of the judiciary as problematic, blurring the distinction between the roles of the executive and the judiciary. They criticise it for effectively watering down the concept of the separation of powers.
The court must, however, be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that each of the obligations, prohibitions and restrictions imposed is necessary and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist attack. The statutory framework governing control orders in Australia is therefore very similar to that of the UK, with a few exceptions.
130
Another difference is the absence of an equivalent to section 8 of the PTA which provides for a legislative 'check and balance' to ensure that the Secretary of State's decision to issue a control order has been undertaken with consideration of the viability of a criminal prosecution. 131 Another, significant, difference of the Australian control order regime is the absence of a mechanism for independent review of ATL in general. In the UK, under section 14(2) of the PTA, an independent reviewer of terrorism The AFP Commissioner is statutorily obliged, under section 104.19(1) of the Criminal Code Act, to apply for revocation of a control order only when satisfied that the grounds for its issuance have ceased to exist -not when evidence becomes available that might support a prosecution. 129 The restrictions include, (a) a prohibition or restriction on the person being at specific areas or places; (c) a requirement that the person remain at specific premises between specified times each day, or on specified days; (e) a prohibition or restriction on the person communicating or associating with specific individuals. 130 Lynch, above n 119, 183. Lynch suggests that the judiciary should be kept out of the process by which the orders are made, and therefore should be reserved for a more clearly defined role of reviewing executive decisions. 131 The Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (UK) c 2, s 8(2) provides that before making or applying for a control order, the Secretary of State must consult the police to ascertain whether there is enough evidence available that could be realistically used for the purposes of prosecuting the individual for a terrorism related offence. Section 8(4) provides that the question of whether a criminal prosecution is viable is kept under review while the order persists and the police are to advise on the matter at meetings of the Control Order Review Group (CORG). See also Lynch, above n 119, 181.
legislation must be appointed -currently Lord Carlile of Berriew. 132 Despite the fact that Australia has an Inspector General of Intelligence and Security, his authority does not cover the activities of the AFP or the legislative framework which governs the Australian control order regime. 133 The appointment of an independent reviewer of terrorist legislation, who would report annually to Parliament and have the ability to set his own agenda, had been recommended by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security. 134 The latest bill, proposing an independent reviewer -the so called National Security Legislation Monitor -is being considered by the Australian government after some considerable debate. 135 Although the proposed monitor's role is modelled on the UK's Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Laws, earlier opinions suggested that the Australian model for an independent reviewer should differ from that of the UK by having a panel of reviewers rather than a single person, in order to draw on wider expertise. 136 It has also been suggested that the reviewers should have explicit links to a Parliamentary committee in order to ensure that there is constant debate on the work of the reviewer. 
Judicial Challenges to Control Orders in Australia
Before turning to the judicial challenges in Australia, it is interesting from a Continental point of view to observe an overall failure by the Australian government to successfully communicate the necessity of control orders to the wider public. 138 The former used the existence of the UK's control order regime as reassurance to the Australian public that control orders were 'not very extraordinary at all', and that the orders came from the legitimate arsenal of anti-terrorism measures that any liberal and democratic government would use in responding to the threat of terrorist violence. 139 Australia is the only western democracy not having a written bill of rights, entrenched or otherwise, for the protection of civil and fundamental rights. Instead, it prefers to rely on informal mechanisms such as a trust in the basic decency of the government, an independent judiciary, the transparency of judicial and administrative processes, and trial by jury. 141 Political and legal debate in Australia is also usually unconstrained by fundamental human rights principles and the rule of law.
142 However, the push for an Consequently, judicial challenges to control orders differ from UK cases by focussing on constitutional questions arising from the application of such measures. 146 The court held by a 5:2 majority (Kirby and Hayne JJ dissenting) that the validity of Division 104 was sufficiently supported by the defence power 147 and did not breach Chapter Three of the Australian Constitution. 148 The appellant, Thomas, argued that Division 104 was invalid because it was not supported by one or more express or implied heads of legislative power under the Commonwealth Constitution.
149
The High Court also rejected Thomas' further argument that the powers invested in the judiciary were not judicial in nature and therefore could not constitutionally be conferred on a court by Commonwealth legislation.
Gleeson CJ quickly dismissed this claim and held that the legislation governing control orders was an exercise of the defence power under section 51(iv) of the Australian Constitution as well as of the external affairs power under section 51(xxix).
150
Gleeson CJ's reasoning for holding that Chapter Three of the Australian Constitution was not contravened 151 included analogies with powers that historically had been exercised by courts in Australia or elsewhere, such as the power to grant bail and to make apprehended violence orders. . 150 Ibid [3] . 151 Ibid [30] . 152 Ibid [17] . Gleeson CJ did concede, however, that neither was a perfect analogy to control orders.
Court also accepted that it was more opportune for a court to exercise such powers than for other institutions to do so. 153 This was due to the courts offering better protection for human rights and to the fact that 'to decide that such powers are exclusively within the province of the executive branch of government would be contrary to our legal history'. 154 The dissenting opinion of Kirby J, however, argued that Division 104 was beyond the judicial power of the Commonwealth, with Kirby J stating that the control order regime was 'novel and offensive to principle'. Although there were no constitutional challenges to the control order regime in that case, the conditions of the order were slightly altered by Federal Magistrate Donald Warren, 158 which could be perceived as a small victory to Mr Hicks in reducing the regularity of his reporting to the police.
159
With few control orders having been issued to date in Australia (compared with a total of 45 in the UK), mounting criticism of the regime and an apparent willingness by Australian security services to resort to monitoring and surveillance tactics instead, the question arose of whether control orders are strictly necessary in Australia at all. 153 Ibid. 154 Canada has taken a different approach from the UK in trying to 'control' terrorist suspects. The policy instrument of choice has been immigration legislation allowing for the deportation -by means of so-called Security Certificates -of non-citizens suspected of constituting a security threat to the country. 160 Only two months after September 11 the Canadian government enacted the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), which received Royal Assent on 1 November 2001. 161 The actual draft legislation pre-dated the 9/11 attacks on the United States, and the content of the Act itself did consequently not reflect on the attacks; its content just served to dampen previous political dissent. 162 The Canadian government had already decided to take a robust approach to non-citizens; the events of September 11 simply made it easier to implement these measures and to communicate them to the broader public. 163 The raison d'être for the use of a security certificate is to remove from Canada 'non-Canadians who have no legal right to be [t] here and who pose a serious threat to Canada and Canadians'. 164 Section 77 of the IRPA allows the issuance of a so-called security certificate, indicating that the presence of a permanent resident or foreign national is undesirable on grounds of (public) security, a possible violation of human or international rights, or allegations of involvement in? serious and organised criminality. 165 Pursuant to section 82(2) of the IRPA, a review of the reasons for continued detention must be commenced, and, until a final determination is made concerning the reasonableness of the certificate, the individual must be brought before a judge at least once in the six month period following reach review. 167 A judge can order continued detention only if he or she is satisfied that the detainee continues to be a threat either to national security or to the safety of others, or that the detainee is unlikely to appear for proceedings or removal. 168 However these requirements are applicable only in cases of a permanent resident. 169 If the subject is a foreign national with non-permanent residence status, 170 the IPRA does not mandate any review of the detention prior to the determination of the security certificates reasonableness.
171
Therefore the decision to issue such a certificate does also serve as a decision on the legality of a subsequent removal order which cannot be appealed against. Once the Security Certificate has been upheld as 'reasonable' by the Federal Court, the named individual is deportable with no further opportunity to appeal. Section 80 of the IRPA implies that the security certificate which has been determined as reasonable by the courts 'serves' as a removal order. The IPRA does not place a statutory limit on the length of detention, except that it allows the person named on the certificate to apply for release at any time, for the purpose of permitting departure from Canada, under section 82.4 of the Act. 173 to believe that the person is a danger to national security, or to the safety of any person, or is unlikely to appear at a proceeding, or for removal. Under s 78 of the IRPA a judge of the Federal Court will then determine whether the certificate is reasonable and will duly quash the certificate if it is not.
that an individual could not be returned to his country of origin if faced 167 Ibid s 82(1) states that a judge must commence a review of the reasons for the person's continued detention within 48 hours after the detention begins. 168 Ibid s 82(5)(a). 169 Macklin, above n 160, 3. with the possibility of torture or any other treatment contrary to article 3 of the ECHR. This position has changed with the introduction of control orders together with so called Deportation with Assurances (DWAs) measures, whereby the Government obtains assurances from other countries which ensure that individuals can be deported there without a risk of their human rights being breached.
174
Section 82.4 of the Canadian IPRA effectively detains foreign nationals suspected of terrorism offences indefinitely, unless they decide to return to their own or another country. This consequence reminds us of the stark warning of Nicholls J in his seminal decision in the UK case A v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 175 where he describes section 23 of the ATCSA as effectively creating a prison which only 'has three walls' due to the certified individuals being allowed release only if they are willing to face the 'prospect of ill treatment in any country willing to admit them'. 176 The constitutionality and reasonableness of the possibility of such indefinite detention under the IRPA was subsequently challenged in Charkaoui v Canada. 177 There the Supreme Court of Canada held that the absence of any detention review for foreign nationals until after the security certificate was reviewed by the Federal Court constituted a violation of the constitutional right against arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 178 In October 2007, the Canadian government responded to the decision of the Supreme Court in Charkaoui by introducing Bill C-3, which amended the IPRA by adding provisions relating to special advocates. However the Bill made no reference to the legality of deporting non-citizens to countries where they face the possibility of torture. The Bill did, however, extend the requirement of a detention review to foreign nationals as well as permanent residents. 
Deportation and the Threat of Torture: Challenges to the Canadian Security Certificate Regime
The possibility of foreign nationals subjected to deportation under the IRPA facing torture and other maltreatment in their countries of origin raises legal questions regarding the possibility of a contravention of article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture, 180 as well as the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 181 The two cases of Suresh v Canada 182 and Ahani v Canada, 183 concerned individuals affected by security certificates and whose possible expulsion from Canada would put them at a substantial risk of torture by their respective governments. They argued that their expulsion would breach article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture.
184
In Suresh, it was alleged that the appellant was a member of and fundraiser for a proscribed terrorist organisation 185 and consequently a security certificate was issued, with the appellant therefore facing the prospect of deportation. 186 The Supreme Court of Canada held that, while it did not exclude the possibility that in 'exceptional circumstances' deportation to face torture might be justified under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 187 it is generally held that foreign nationals should not be deported when there is a substantial risk of torture.
The Court stated that it was not directly constrained by article 3 of the UN Convention, but the 'fundamental justice balance under section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms generally precludes deportation to torture when applied on a case by case basis'. 189 The Supreme Court reaffirmed this view in its decision in the case of Ahani, and held that the findings in Suresh in respect to the prohibition to deport in cases of the possibility of torture should be followed. 190 Despite this confirmation, the court dismissed the case of Ahani on the grounds that Ahani did not face a substantial and realistic risk of torture in Iran due his personal affiliation to the regime in Tehran. 191 This decision in Ahani seems to overlook the fact that Canada is party to the UN Torture Convention, and also appears to contradict the continental view and position of the UK as highlighted by the ECtHR in the case of Chahal v UK discussed above. Despite its regional character, the ECHR does indeed reiterate the binding international character of the prohibition of the use of torture as a jus cogens prohibition of international law. It seems that the Canadian government is aware of its legally doubtful position as evidenced by it having chosen to invoke 'exceptional circumstances' in each security certificate case where the opportunity has arisen 192 The current measures taken by Canada in her attempt to prevent foreign nationals from becoming a terrorist threat to the nation are, as demonstrated, more radical, or even draconian, than those adopted by the UK and Australia. The UK has addressed the threat of future terrorist attacks through the enactment of control orders and assurance arrangements (DWAs) with several countries. Undoubtedly, the Canadian security certificate regime would not be acceptable in the UK, which has moved away from the previous detention without trial regime, implemented under the ATCSA. The UK's new control order regime appears certainly preferable to the security certificate system of Canada thanks to its apparent compliance with international human rights law. in order to justify a possible derogation from its state obligations under international law. 189 Ibid. Canadian government named him on a security certificate as they suspected him of being a member of the Iranian Secret Intelligence, which the government alleged was a terrorist organisation. 191 Ibid [26] . 192 Macklin, above n 160, 4.
V THE FUTURE OF CONTROL ORDERS: PROPOSED REFORMS AND ALTERNATIVE MEASURES
Control orders have now been in existence for five years and seem set to remain in force for the foreseeable future, despite the legal challenges and media scrutiny. The UK's new coalition government, which came into power on 12 May 2010, has ordered a review of the current control order regime, a review which formed part of their manifesto pledge to the electorate. 193 Prior to the 2010 election the Liberal Democrats wanted control orders to be completely scrapped whereas the Conservatives only wanted a review, and have consistently abstained from voting against control orders in Parliament. 194 Nevertheless, senior representatives from both parties have called control orders 'illiberal ', 195 'inherently objectionable' and 'illconceived'. 196 The future of control orders and proposed reforms must be informed by the current high national security threat that terrorism continues to pose to the UK, a situation which is unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. Indeed it may even be fuelled by the ongoing military engagements arising out of what was once labelled the 'war on terror' by the United States of America and its allies. The British government's official response to this threat is centred on 'prevention' Against this background of earlier dissent, we will now briefly reflect on proposed reforms for control orders and/or alternative measures that could be implemented. 197 which is reflected in its 'counter strategy to the threat of terrorism' or 'CONTEST'. The aim of the strategy -'Pursue, Prevent, Protect, Prepare' -is 'to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from international terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence'.
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A An Alternative Approach I: Travel Restriction Orders
Lord Carlile, in his latest report on control orders, 200 has suggested the possibility of Travel Restriction Orders (TROs) as a substitute and replacement for 'light touch' control orders, which are those considered to place lesser restrictions upon the individual. 201 The main purpose of the TROs would be to restrain an individual, who appears not to have participated in any other terrorist acts or planning, from leaving the United Kingdom to train as a terrorist or otherwise participate in terrorist attacks outside the UK. 202 The TROs would be intended for individuals who had become radicalised, and whose first and early intentions are manifested by the desire to go for training and/or act as an insurgent. 203 A similar concept to the TROs, namely that of 'foreign restriction orders', is provided for under section 58 of the Counter Terrorism Act 2008. 204 However, these measures can only be imposed on an individual upon their actual conviction for a terrorism offence. TROs would apply in the absence of conviction for a terrorist offence, and will offer 'proportionate protection in relation to a demonstrable intelligence-based risk assessment'. 205 The outline of the proposed TROs is akin to the outline of the control order system. They would be issued by the Home Secretary and last for up to a year at a time. 206 An objective test would be set out whereby the Home Secretary would have to be satisfied that there is reasonable suspicion of an intention to act and he or she would need to consider the TRO necessary to protect others from the risk of terrorism. available to place upon the individual concerned. 208 It would be possible for the TRO to prohibit travel entirely or travel to certain designated countries. As with control orders, a breach of a TRO would result in mandatory criminal prosecution 209 with only limited right to appeal.
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Whether TROs could constitute a real alternative to control orders remains to be seen. It seems as if the scope of restrictions available under both orders is identical. The current restrictions available under the control order system allow for a suspect to be restricted from leaving the UK, and subjected to all the conditions that the suggested TROs could impose.
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The overall usefulness of TROs in curbing the threat of 'home grown terrorists' is questionable. Jihadist training manuals and detailed instructions for bomb making are readily available on the internet. The July 7 bombers actually prepared for their attacks while in the UK.
The suggested outline and application of the new TROs indicate that they are just the existing control order regime renamed in order to change public perception. 212 The identification of possible 'travel' candidates before subjecting them to TROs may, however, be useful to intelligence agencies, as the profiling of behavioural patterns of terrorist suspects has helped to disrupt other terrorist cells prior to and since July 7. 213 The previous Labour government said that it would look into the recommendation of TROs further, but has highlighted similar criticisms to those outlined here, in its response to Lord Carlile's proposals. unknown at present how the current Tory-Liberal government will consider the recommendation of TROs in its review of the control order regime.
B An Alternative Approach II: Civil Contingencies Act 2004
An alternative, more drastic, approach to control orders would be the invocation of emergency powers under Part II of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 (CCA). 215 This would allow legislation to be passed providing for detention without trial in times of an acute emergency if certain conditionslisted in section 21 -were met. Such conditions are: that an emergency has occurred, is occurring or is about to occur (section 21(2)); that it is necessary to make provision for the purpose of preventing, controlling or mitigating an aspect or effect of the emergency (section 21(3); and that the need for the provision referred to in subsection (3) is urgent (section 21(4). 216 The Act expressly refers to terrorism in its definition of an 'emergency' under section 19(1)(c). Use of the CCA in these circumstances could be seen as a legal safeguard for suspects as its emergency powers are strictly limited in their scope and duration. 217 Consequently, this could lead to improved civil liberties protection for individuals. The human rights pressure group Liberty appears to favour the CCA as the preferred basis for detention without trial under emergency conditions: 218 Emergency measures in the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 could already be triggered in a genuine emergency in which the police are overwhelmed by multiple terror plots, allowing the government to temporarily extend precharge detention subject to Parliamentary and judicial oversight. Safeguards offered by government today offer far less protection than that offered in the Civil Contingencies Act. 219 Liberty perceives the selective use of emergency powers under the CCA as a balance between the civil liberties of an individual and the threat that terrorism poses to national security. This view, however, seems to overlook the considerable difficulties in directly applying the provisions of the CCA to individuals. The emergency powers provided for under the CCA are clearly designed to apply to the whole of the UK, or to specific regions, which are affected by a situation requiring the use of such powers. In Lord Carlile's opinion, a significant problem in using the CCA to detain or restrict terrorist suspects, is that the Act does not allow emergency legislation to affect criminal proceedings. 220 The Act also does not expressly allow for the detention of individuals, 221 despite the wide scope of section 22(3). 222 In conclusion, one can only warn against the all too eager application of emergency regulations in times of a continuing terrorist threat, which would undoubtedly affect the scope of our civil liberties in general and accountability for them.
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C An Alternative Approach III: The Use of Intercept Evidence in Criminal Prosecution
The Labour government stated that prosecution is always the preferred approach for dealing with terrorist suspects, and control orders are used only when prosecution or deportation is not possible. 224 There is a suggestion by whom that the prosecution of terrorist suspects, who are otherwise subject to control orders, could be significantly increased if intercept evidence were admissible in court. Currently section 17 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) excludes evidence in connection with any legal proceedings which discloses the contents of an intercepted communication or related communications data. This is in contrast to the position in Australia which has no such restrictions on the use of intercept evidence, 225 providing that the interception has been lawfully carried out. 226 In 2008, Sir John Chilcot chaired a Privy Council review to advise the government on the possibility of using intercepted material as evidence in court. The review considered the benefits which would be expected to result from the use of intercept evidence, in addition to the risks and the envisaged resource implications of any changes in the law. 228 It concluded that a means of using intercept evidence should be introduced into UK law 'by developing a robust legal model based in statute and compatible with the ECHR ', 229 provided that the use of the intercept material met certain operational requirements and was in toto ECHR-compatible. 230 Serious doubts in regard to ensuring fairness in court remained 231 and were confirmed in a recent ruling of the ECtHR in the case of Natunen v Finland. 232 However, a possible redrafting of section 17 RIPA has gained much support from several quarters of the government, with the Home Affairs Committee strongly recommending an immediate introduction of legislation allowing the use of intercept evidence in court. 233 The Committee maintains its view expressed in 2007 that it is 'ridiculous that our prosecutors are denied the use of ... evidence that has been proved helpful in many other jurisdictions'. 234 The former Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Sir Ken Macdonald, supported the opinion of the Home Affairs Committee by asserting that, if the UK had intercept evidence as an evidential tool, it would almost certainly 'mirror the experience of other jurisdictions where it is used frequently to great effect and results in the saving of considerable expense'. 235 Lord Carlile has, however, stated that it is unlikely that the admissibility of intercept evidence would have led to the prosecution of any of the controlees since the control orders regime was introduced in 2005. 236 His statement is supported by a review of nine current or former control order cases, which concluded that intercept evidence would not have enabled a criminal prosecution to be brought in any of the cases studied. 237 Comparisons with other jurisdictions were rejected as 'ill-informed and misleading'. UK's adversarial legal system the requirements for the disclosure of material to the defence are far more demanding in terms of parity and equality of arms than in the legal system of any comparable country.
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Due to this most recent rejection of the former government's proposed model for allowing intercept evidence to be used in court, it is clear that such evidence will not be admissible in terrorist trials for the foreseeable future.
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D Possible Reforms of the Current Control Order System
Even if intercept evidence were made available, in Lord Carlile's opinion this would not have helped to prosecute any of the 12 terrorist suspects who are subject to control orders at the present time. This warrants the question of what evidence the security services and police had on the 12 individuals that led them to believe they were a threat to national security and UK public.
An important reform to the current control order system suggested by Lord Carlile and other commentators would be to impose a time limit of 12 months on control orders, without the option of renewal. 241 Lord Carlile's reasoning was that, after a year of an individual being subject to a control order, the 'immediate utility of even a dedicated terrorist attack will have seriously been disrupted'. 242 This view was confirmed by the tribunal in the case of Secretary of State for the Home Department v GG, 243 where it was stated that after '2 years an individual subject to a control order will have lost his usefulness to those engaged in terrorist activities'. 244 Such a view on the 'arbitrary end date' for individual control orders 245 was not shared by the last government, which stressed that the PTA provided effective checks and balances to ensure that the opportunity to renew a control order, if it is necessary, is lawful. date would allow individual terrorism suspects and controlees to simply disengage from involvement with terrorist-related activity, knowing that they could re-engage after the end of that time period. 247 The impact of indefinite control orders on the lives of controlees can be quite significant. Without a definite time limit, individuals under a control order remain in a 'state of suspended investigation' year after year with only limited appeal possibilities -a situation to which criminal suspects are not subject. 248 Presently, out of the 12 individuals subject to a control order, three have been subjected to the order for more than two years, with one of those controlees now in his fifth year. 249 With control orders having no definite end date, an individual could be subject to one for an infinite period of time, with no realistic prospect of being either prosecuted or released -a truly Kafkaesque situation. 250 It appears that control orders at present are used to 'plug the gap' in cases where neither prosecution nor deportation would work as security measures.
Having assessed the reforms and alternative measures proposed by various commentators, one must conclude that control orders are here to stay. There are no clear alternatives which can effectively 'prevent' an individual from participating in terrorist related activity. The previous government maintained that abandoning the control order system entirely would have a serious damaging impact on national security, 251 a view shared by Lord Carlile.
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A possible reform could be the introduction of a time limit of 12 months without further renewal options. This would result in greater civil liberties protection for the individual while helping to strike a balance between the liberty of an individual and the security of the nation.
However, it has yet to be seen whether the new Tory-Liberal government will adopt this view after it has undertaken a review of the control order regimeone of its pledges to the electorate after coming into power.
protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism; or (b) for the purposes connected with preventing or restricting involvement by that person in terrorism related activity. 247 Ibid. 248 Walker, above n 197, 16. 249 Carlile, above n 132, [43] . 250 Franz Kafka, The Trial (Penguin, 2000) . 251 Home Office, above n 245, 1. 252 Carlile, above n 132, [85] .
VI CONCLUSION
Amidst the considerable controversy which has arisen since their implementation, control orders have now commenced their sixth year of operation. The essential question to ask, however, is whether they have been successful in 'preventing' the individuals subject to them from participating in terrorism related activity. The government has stated in the past that the control order regime has successfully protected the UK from a possible terrorist attack by preventing the individuals successfully from participating in any possible terrorist related activity. But this 'success' came at the cost of possible violation of these individuals' right to liberty, as granted under article 5 of the ECHR.
The UK is not alone in respect of such controversy. The Commonwealth jurisdictions of Canada and Australia faced massive criticism of their antiterrorism legislation. The constitutional validity of Australia's control order regime, which has been heavily influenced by the UK precedent, has been challenged. In Australia, by contrast with the UK, no jurisprudence exists on the possible conflict between the right to liberty and the security of the nation. However, with Australia's likely adoption of a federal Charter of Rights, there remains a remote possibility that a civil liberties challenge to the country's control order regime could eventually arise. In Canada, however, cases have been decided concerning the country's security certificate regime. An apparent shortcoming of this regime lies in Canada's use of deportation measures against foreign nationals suspected of terrorism and of the possibility of the suspects' torture, if they are deported.
The present situation in the UK is that a curfew length of less than 16 hours will not constitute a deprivation of an individual's liberty. Nevertheless, the judiciary has shown that it will not hesitate to cancel any control order, as evidenced in the abovementioned cases of JJ and AP, which it considers an interference of an individual's article 5 rights. Currently the ECHR ruling in Guzzardi, suggests that, for control orders, the threshold for a deprivation of liberty within the meaning of article 5 is set at a very high level. Until a control order case concerning article 5 reaches the ECtHR in Strasbourg, the government will continue to use such orders. 254 Today, control orders may constitute the most effective means of 'preventing' individuals from participating in terrorist related activity. The alternative measures which have been identified by various commentators do not stand up to scrutiny in terms of effectiveness. However, one reform that should be adopted by the government is a time limit of 12 months without a further renewal period. In other words, if the individual subject to a control order has not been prosecuted within 12 months of receiving the order, then there should be no option for a renewal. This would strike a fairer balance between an individual's fundamental right to liberty and the right of the government to protect its citizens from the threat of terrorism.
Until the terrorist threat which the UK faces diminishes, or an alternative method is suggested that has not already been identified -which appears unlikely -control orders are likely to remain. If they were abolished it would be necessary to release the 12 individuals subjected to control orders, a notion which the government will simply not accept, as it believes the 12 controlees to be a threat to the lives of its citizens, which it aims to protect.
Time will tell to what extent Realpolitik will dictate the future actions of the present UK coalition government and to what extent the underlying conflict between human rights and overall state security, as exemplified in Lord Hoffmann's stern warning quoted above, will be resolved. 
